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1. Introduction 
It is well-known that people mainly consume domestically produced goods and 
that stock market investors prefer domestic assets. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
initiated a new stream in empirical literature when they cited these facts as two of 
the  six  major  puzzles  in  international  economics.  Portes  and  Rey  (2005) 
uncovered a specific geographical pattern of international asset transactions and 
proved that the information required to evaluate financial assets is not equally 
available  to  all  market participants  and  that  lacking  such  information  is  much 
more  important  than  any  diversification  opportunities  in  foreign  markets. 
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Therefore, increasing the comparability and transparency of financial information 
and making accounting information more easily understood worldwide may have 
far-reaching consequences where foreign activities are concerned. 
A number of international organisations, such as the United Nations, the World 
Bank  and  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO),  are  involved  in  attempts  to 
harmonise accounting. These organisations support the effort of the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to eliminate the barriers to investments flows 
among different countries and to strengthen international financial architecture. 
International  Accounting  Standards  (IAS)  are  rapidly  converging.  Over  100 
countries  have  already  adopted  International  Financial  Reporting  Standards 
(IFRS)  for  financial  reporting  purposes.  Hence,  the  question  of  whether  the 
adoption of IFRS fosters foreign activities is of special interest, particularly in 
light of the European Union’s recent adoption of IFRS for listed companies. IFRS 
adoption  may  help  IFRS-users  from  other  countries  to  understand  financial 
information, thus reducing information asymmetries between users of financial 
statements in different countries. 
This paper aims to provide empirical evidence of the effect of IFRS adoption in 
Europe by focusing on the importance of European accounting harmonisation on 
international trade in goods and foreign direct investments (FDI) at country level. 
The  results  support  IFRS  adoption  having  an  important  effect  on  reducing 
information  costs  and  investor  uncertainty.  Hence,  foreign  activities  increase 
among European countries.  
This paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes key issues in European 
accounting harmonisation, establishes a theoretical link between IFRS adoption 
and  information  asymmetries  and  highlights  the  main  hypotheses.  Section  3 
covers the empirical strategy, where data, sources and variables are described and   3 
the estimated  equation is presented. Section 4 presents the main results and a 
sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 5 presents the conclusions drawn.  
2. Accounting harmonisation and information asymmetries 
2.1. The accounting harmonisation process in the European Union 
As regards the European accounting harmonisation process, the main instruments 
used to promote accounting harmonisation within the European Union (EU) were 
the Fourth and Seventh Company Law Directives. The former (1978) aimed to 
harmonise the national laws on the accounting regulations and intended to make it 
easier for investors, lenders and suppliers to obtain, understand and rely on the 
accounts of companies in other Member States and to promote fair competition 
among  Member  State  companies.  The  latter  (1983)  concerned  consolidated 
accounting in Member States. The implementation of the Directives into national 
law  brought  about  a  change  in  the  aim  of  accounting  in  many  Continental 
European  countries,  which  shifted  from  the  purpose  of  determining  tax  and 
dividend payments to providing timely and useful information to investors for 
their decision-making. Moreover, the Directives have had a real positive impact, 
as the quality of financial reporting increased in Member States. Nonetheless, as 
the Commission of the European Communities (1995) pointed out “the adoption 
and implementation of the Fourth and Seventh Directives were only achieved with 
difficulty and no further progress has been made at the EU level in harmonising 
the basic rules on accounting and financial reporting”
2 since the Directives were 
originally  negotiated  by  the  inclusion  of  numerous  options  open  to  different 
interpretations.  Consequently,  large  European  companies  seeking  capital  in 
international capital markets had to prepare a second set of accounts and a clear 
preference was expressed for the need to take into account harmonisation efforts 
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at  a  broader  international  level  (European  Communities,  1995;  page  3).  As  a 
result, the EU began to support the efforts of the IASB to develop IAS. Finally, in 
2002, the EU adopted an IAS Regulation requiring that all EU listed companies 
prepare their consolidated financial statements in accordance with IFRS from the 
year 2005 onwards. As a consequence, about 7,000 EU listed companies were 
required  to  prepare  financial  statements  according  to  IFRS.  Additionally,  EU 
countries have the option of requiring/permitting IFRS for unlisted companies and 
parent company (unconsolidated) financial statements, leading to heterogeneity in 
the status of the implementation of IAS in the EU (see Implementation of the IAS 
Regulation – 1606/2002 – in the EU and EEA). 
Nonetheless,  the  barriers  to  increased  harmonisation  in  the  EU  should  be 
discussed.  First,  the  large  number  of  exceptions  and  exemptions  permitted  by 
IFRS 1: First-time Adoption of IFRS,
3 means that the degree of cross-country 
harmonisation  in  accounting  practices  may  have  been  limited  in  the  period 
immediately  after  mandatory  adoption  by  EU  countries.  Second,  ignoring 
transitional arrangements implies that the adoption of IFRS does not guarantee 
significant improvements in EU accounting practices because of the continued 
absence  of  a  recognised  set  of  international  Generally  Accepted  Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Therefore, whether predicted increases in the comparability 
and quality of financial reporting post-IFRS adoption leads to improved flows in 
foreign activities has to be analysed from an empirical perspective. 
2.2. Accounting information, information asymmetries and foreign activities 
Information asymmetries arising from differences in financial reporting influence 
foreign  investments,  as  they  affect  firms’  performance  when  locating  and 
investing abroad. Otherwise, the relationship through which financial accounting 
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information matters on trade in goods is not so straightforward and may be related 
to the common practice in international trade of delivering trade credits.
4 
Portes and Rey (2005) stated that knowledge of accounting practices is part of the 
information  required  to  evaluate  markets,  whereas  Ahearne  et  al  (2004) 
highlighted  the  importance  of  informational  barriers  constituted  by  different 
national  accounting  standards,  disclosure  requirements  and  regulatory 
environments. Therefore, a uniform set of accounting standards, such as IFRS, 
can lower the levels of existing information asymmetries among investors. 
Figure 1 distinguishes two effects through which  IFRS adoption might reduce 
cross-border information asymmetries at country level: a transparency effect (i.e., 
compared to local GAAP, the transparency of financial statements increases); and 
comparability and, hence, familiarity, become effects of IFRS adoption (i.e., firms 
in country i and j use the same accounting standards). 
Figure 1. The transparency and comparability effect of IFRS adoption. 
 
The transparency effect implicitly assumes that accounting quality increases by 
switching  from  local  GAAP  to  IFRS  (Barth  et  al,  2008).  An  increase  in 
transparency is understood as a stronger relationship between reported financial 
information and the firm’s value and is, therefore, considered a key factor for any 
good investment relationship. Additionally, the transparency effect reinforces the 
comparability effect, which increases the familiarity required to allow markets to 
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operate more efficiently. Both the transparency and comparability effects decrease 
the informational differences of domestic and foreign agents and are expected to 
have a positive effect on foreign activities. 
Causality could also work in the opposite direction; that is, countries may adopt 
IFRS as a result of foreign activities or, what is even more likely, there may be a 
factor  affecting  both  foreign  activities  and  IFRS  adoption.  The  importance  of 
investigating this reverse effect has been acknowledged, but this research focuses 
exclusively on how IFRS adoption per se affects trade in goods and foreign direct 
investments. 
2.3. Main Hypotheses 
Accounting covers the  way to disclose a firm’s results and position. Hence,  a 
common set of accounting standards in trading or investing partners is expected to 
foster the comparability effect. At country level, Amiram (2009) finds that foreign 
investors have higher holdings of foreign equity portfolio investments in countries 
that  use  IFRS.  This  relationship  is  stronger  if  the  foreign  investors  are  from 
countries that have also adopted IFRS, whereas Beneish et al (2009) show that 
IFRS adoption has a positive effect on cross-border debt investments, and that this 
increase is driven by those countries with weaker investor protection and higher 
financial  risk.  These  papers  show  that  benefits  are  expected  from  enhanced 
comparability  and  reduced  information  processing  costs  after  IFRS  adoption. 
Nonetheless,  Devalle  et  al  (2010)  show  that  cross-border  comparability  of 
financial  statements  may  not  have  been  achieved  in  Europe  post-IFRS,  as 
significant differences between European accounting standards still remain and 
the  impact  of  IFRS  adoption  differs  from  one  country  to  another  countries. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis to be tested is that IFRS adoption has benefited   7 
European countries in terms of trade in goods and FDI, as IFRS adoption might 
have increased comparability among adopters. 
Empirical evidence obtains mixed results regarding the overall impact of IFRS on 
accounting  quality.  On  the  one  hand,  many  international  firms  use  the  same 
accounting standards after IFRS adoption, which has made it more difficult for 
investors to distinguish between financially transparent and opaque firms. In fact, 
Callao et al (2007) show that book value differs significantly from market value 
under IFRS in Spanish listed companies and Christensen et al (2008) find that 
IFRS per se does not change accounting quality. Otherwise, accounting quality is 
linked to the incentives to prepare high-quality financial statements. On the other 
hand,  IFRS  adoption  may  be  considered  as  a  means  of  giving  credibility  to 
corporate  financial  statements.  For  example,  Jermakowicz  et  al  (2007)  find  a 
significant relationship between the book value of earnings and market value of 
equity in the German premium stock market, then obtaining that IFRS adoption 
has increased the value relevance of earnings relative to market prices. Therefore, 
the  second  hypothesis  tests  whether  there  is  a  positive  transparency  effect  in 
IFRS-adopting countries that decreases information costs and fosters exports and 
foreign investments. 
Testing these two hypotheses at country level will contribute to the insight in the 
literature regarding IFRS adoption by providing evidence of a differential impact 
on foreign activities due to the comparability and transparency effects stemming 
from European accounting harmonisation. 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Data, sources and variables 
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes data on bilateral exports of 
goods  in  the  EU  from  2002  to  2007,  as  well  as  data  on  bilateral  FDI  flows   8 
(namely  investments  by  resident  entities  in  affiliated  enterprises  abroad)  from 
2002 to 2007. FDI data also include a control group that consists of the United 
States,  China,  Japan,  EFTA  members  (Switzerland,  Norway,  and  Iceland)  and 
candidate countries (Croatia, Turkey). Total FDI flows are broken down by the 
type  of  instrument  used  for  making  the  investment:  equity  capital,  reinvested 
earnings  and  loans.  Equity  capital  comprises  equity  in  branches,  all  shares  in 
subsidiaries  and  associates,  and  other  contributions  (such  as  the  provision  of 
machinery). Reinvested earnings consist in the direct investor’s share of earnings 
that are not distributed by the direct investment enterprise. Loans cover borrowing 
and lending funds. This variable includes debt securities and trade credits between 
direct investors and direct investment enterprises. Both trade and FDI data were 
obtained from Eurostat. 
Data about the use of IFRS around the world were obtained from Deloitte (2003-
2008)  and  Amiram  (2009).  Distance  is  taken  from  the  Centre  d’études 
prospectives  et  d’informations  internationales  (CEPII),  while  income  and 
population were obtained from World Development Indicators (WDI) online. 
In order to test the entire hypothesis outlined in Section 2, additional variables are 
required. Firstly, to analyse the comparability effect, we use a dummy that takes a 
value of 1 when listed companies in both exporting and importing countries use 
IFRS  for  domestic  reporting  in  year  t.  Secondly,  to  analyse  whether  an 
improvement  in  transparency  in  IFRS-adopting  countries  has  reinforced  the 
comparability  effect,  a  transparency  measure  is  required.  As  the  transparency 
effect reflects a stronger relationship between reported financial information and 
the firm’s value, a firm-level variable should be used. Nonetheless, the approach 
used in the present paper does not allow capturing the firm-level transparency 
effect. So, only the indirect country-level transparency effect is proxied. To this   9 
end, and given that the results in the literature are mixed, proxies of accounting 
quality are used in the econometric analysis. More specifically, a large sample of 
firms in different countries is considered to test the transparency of accounts by 
looking at the average level of earnings quality. As earnings quality refers to the 
ability of reported earnings to reflect a company’s true earnings, two different 
proxy variables are used. First, the percentage of firms in a country expressing 
that a typical firm reports less than 100% of sales for tax purposes
5 and, second, 
the percentage of firms in a country with annual financial statements reviewed by 
an external auditor. These variables are obtained from Enterprise Surveys data 
(The World Bank, 2010). This survey reports information about the propensity to 
operate informally for tax purposes, as well as other firms’ characteristics in a 
number of countries, mainly developing and transition countries. Then, the initial 
sample  is  reduced  considerably  when  the  transparency  effect  is  included  in 
regressions. Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the countries and years for which 
we obtain data in earnings quality from Business Surveys, as well as the number 
of firms surveyed in a sample year, the two variables considered to proxy for 
transparency effect and an additional control in trade regressions (percentage of 
exporting firms). 
Table 1
6 shows a summary of the variables used in the empirical analysis and 
Table  2  presents  summary  statistics  of  a  number  of  variables  included  in  the 
analysis.  First,  legal  origins,  which  relate  to  aspects  such  as  enforcement  and 
shareholder rights in different countries, are detailed by country. Second, Table 2 
shows the mean of bilateral exports (in millions of euro) that all EU-27 Members 
have exported to their EU trading partners since 1999. The data show that the 
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firms. 
6 Table 1: The first column lists the variables used for the empirical analysis; the second column 
outlines a description of the variables, and the third column shows the data sources.   10 
most important intra-EU exporters of goods are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, transition countries, such 
as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia 
have experienced the highest increase in terms of intra-EU exports. Finally, Table 
2 shows the mean of FDI inflows (in millions of euro) in all  EU-27 Members 
from  their  EU  partners,  along  with  the  United  States,  China,  Japan,  EFTA 
Members and candidate countries since 1999. The data show that the “oldest” EU 
Members, such as Belgium, France, Germany,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom, receive the highest FDI inflows in 
the EU. Nonetheless, the highest increase in terms of FDI inflows is experienced 
in transition countries, such as Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Romania. 
Overall, the highest increase in both exports and FDI inflows from 1999 onwards 
has been experienced by transition economies. 
3.2. Model specification  
One of the main devices used to analyse the determinants of international trade 
flows is the gravity model of trade. Additionally, De Ménil (1999) finds that a 
gravity model accounts well for FDI among European countries. Therefore, the 
gravity  model  is  the  modelling  framework  used  in  this  paper.  The  estimated 
equation is: 
ijt t ijt ij ijt
jt it jt it ij ijt
FIX Dist IFRS
P P Y Y X
e d a a a
a a a a d
+ + × + × + × +
+ × + × + × + × + =
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4 3 2 1
ln
ln ln ln ln ln
          (1) 
where ln denotes natural logarithms, Xij denotes the value of bilateral exports/FDI 
flows from country i to j at time t. As in Portes and Rey (2005), the dependent 
variables are expressed in nominal terms. Yi and Yj represent the economic size of 
the  origin  and  destination  countries,  which  is  measured  with  gross  domestic 
product  (GDP).  Pi  and  Pj  are  the  population  of  the  origin  and  destination 
countries. IFRSijt represents either the comparability or the familiarity effect of   11 
IFRS adoption. Distij is calculated using bilateral distances between the largest 
cities of country i and j, the intercity distances being weighted by the share of the 
city in the country’s overall population. FIXijt is an exchange rate stability dummy 
variable which introduces the effect of currency volatility in the analysis. This 
variable  is  constructed  for  each  bilateral  relationship  and  equals  one  if  the 
destination country maintained a fixed exchange rate or one pegged to the Euro 
during  the  period  t.  t d   represents  time  dummies,  which  are  included  in  the 
regressions as other events which occurred in the same year as the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in a particular country may influence the results. Finally,  ijt e  is 
the error term. 
4. Main results 
4.1. The effect of IFRS adoption on international trade 
In order to analyse the effect of IFRS adoption on trade in goods, Equation (1) is 
estimated with the data from the EU-27 Member countries from 2002 to 2007. As 
the dataset is a panel, special estimation techniques are required. The presence of 
unobserved  heterogeneity  could  be  modelled  as  being  random  or  fixed.  A 
Hausman test indicates that random effects are preferred and we therefore rely on 
random effects estimates. Table 3 shows the estimation results. Column (1) tests 
the comparability effect for the entire sample and shows not only that income, 
population  and  exchange  rate  stability  are  significant,  but  also  the  expected 
positive sign. Distance is significant and negatively signed, as expected. These 
results reject the hypothesis that the comparability effect has benefited European 
countries in terms of trade in goods, as the IFRS dummy is not significant. The 
results  in  Column  (2)  corroborate  this  result  for  the  sample  of  EU  countries 
included in Table A.1 (Appendix) and where an additional control is included (the 
number  of  exporting  firms).  The  rest  of  Table  3  tests  the  transparency  effect.   12 
Results in Columns (3) and (5) show a positive and significant transparency effect 
of IFRS adoption, as the higher the number of firms expressing that a typical firm 
reports less than 100% of sales for tax purposes in the exporting country (lower 
transparency), the lower exports and the higher the number of firms with financial 
statements reviewed by an external auditor in the exporting country, the higher 
exports, possibly due to the sunk costs which need to be met to participate in 
export markets and for which external funding is often required. Otherwise, the 
results obtained in Columns (4) and (6) show contrasting results. The higher the 
number of firms expressing that a typical firm reports less than 100% of sales for 
tax purposes in the importing country, the higher exports, thus probably indicating 
that borrowers did not look at firm accounts to provide trade credits to import, 
whereas the higher the number of firms with financial statements reviewed by an 
external auditor in the importing country, the higher exports, indicating that larger 
and more transparent firms participate to a greater extent in international markets. 
4.2. The effect of IFRS adoption on FDI 
In order to consider the problem of bias and inconsistency of the estimates in the 
presence of endogenous variables, Equation (1) is estimated by random effects in 
three steps  for  FDI  regressions.  In a first step,  a trade regression is estimated 
according  to  Equation  (2).  A  number  of  controls  are  included  to  proxy  for 
similarities  in  history,  traditions,  culture,  and  institutional  relationships  among 
countries and excludes both the comparability and the transparency effect of IFRS 
adoption.  
ijt t ij ij ij
ij ij ijt ijt ij
jt it jt it ij ijt
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where EUijt takes a value of 1 when countries are members of the EU in the year t. 
Adjij is a dummy that takes a value of 1 when countries share the same border and   13 
zero otherwise. Langij is a dummy for countries sharing a language that is spoken 
by at least 9% of the population in both countries. Dummy variables indicating 
whether the two countries had a common colonizer after 1945 (comcol), have had 
a colonial relationship after 1945 (col45) or were the same country (smctry), are 
also included in the model. Results show that income, population, colonial links, 
regional  integration  and  exchange  rate  stability  are  significant  and  positively 
signed, whereas distance is significant, but negatively signed.
7 
In a second step, the prediction of exports is calculated ( ijt X ˆ ), and in a third step, 
the lagged prediction of exports ( 1 ˆ
- ijt X ) is included as an explanatory variable in 
the estimation of foreign direct investments, as shown in Equation (3).
8 
ijt ijt ij ijt
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z r r r
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Equation (3) is estimated with the FDI data from the EU-27 Member countries, 
the  United  States,  China  (excluding  Hong  Kong)  and  Japan,  EFTA  countries 
(except Liechtenstein) and candidate countries (Croatia and Turkey) from 2002 to 
2007.
9 Columns (7), (8), (9) and (10) in Table 4 display the estimation results for 
FDI,  equity  (EQ),  retained  earnings  (RE)  and  loans,  respectively.  For  FDI 
regressions, the comparability effect of IFRS adoption is positive and significant 
for equity, retained earnings and loans. The comparability effect of IFRS adoption 
has increased FDI in Europe by 22% {(exp[0,2] -1)*100}. Columns (11), (12), 
(13) and (14) show the results obtained for the transparency effect. According to 
these results, higher transparency in the destination country (thus decreasing the 
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exports. The results are available upon request from the author. 
9 The dataset includes a maximum of 1,190 (35x34) cross-country FDI flows and 6 years, resulting 
in a maximum of 7,140 observations. The presence of missing/zero values in the bilateral FDI 
flows data considerably reduces the sample.   14 
number of firms that report less sales for tax purposes),
10 leads to an increase in 
investment flows from abroad. 
4.3. Sensitivity analysis 
As  shown  in  the  main  analysis,  the  IFRS  comparability  effect  is  found  to  be 
significant on FDI, but not so where trade in goods is concerned. Therefore, in 
this section we delve deeper into the comparability effect of IFRS adoption on 
foreign investments by considering that the IFRS comparability effect may differ 
across  countries  depending  on  behavioural  factors.  IFRS  should  lower  the 
perceived  risk  of  doing  business  with  unfamiliar  people  in  more  uncertainty-
averse countries to a greater extent, as uncertainty-averse economic agents dislike 
situations  in  which  information  is  less  readily  available.  The  Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index (UAI) is used to analyse whether the comparability effect differs 
across countries according to behavioural factors. 
A cluster analysis is performed to classify EU countries according to their UAI. 
Table 5 shows that three groups are distinguished. The first group (with the lowest 
UAI) includes countries with English and Scandinavian legal origins, the second 
group mostly includes countries with a German legal tradition. Finally, the third 
group includes countries with relatively high uncertainty-aversion in the EU. 
A dummy variable is constructed for these three groups, such that the dummy 
proxying countries with low-uncertainty aversion interacts with the comparability 
IFRS  dummy.  Columns  (15),  (16),  (17)  and  (18)  in  Table  4  show  the  results 
obtained,  providing  evidence  that  countries  with  medium  and  high-uncertainty 
aversion have increased equity flows and loans abroad to a greater extent than 
low-uncertainty countries. 
 
                                                 
10 Similar conclusions are derived when using the alternative variable (percentage of firms with 
financial statements reviewed by an external auditor). The results are available upon request from 
the author.   15 
5. Conclusions 
This paper shows that the accounting harmonisation process in Europe is a way to 
reduce information costs and unfamiliarity between countries and, therefore, an 
important way of encouraging international trade and foreign direct investments. 
Two main hypotheses are tested at country-level. First, IFRS adoption benefits 
European  countries  if  it  leads  to  increased  comparability  among  adopters  and 
second, the existence of a positive transparency effect in IFRS-adopting countries 
is also tested. The results obtained provide support for both the comparability and 
transparency effects. Furthermore, uncertainty-averse countries benefit the most 
from IFRS adoption in terms of foreign direct investments. Therefore, accounting 
standard harmonisation can be considered a strategy to reduce the perceived risks 
of investing abroad. 
In  summary,  adopting  a  high  quality  set  of  harmonised  accounting  standards 
fosters  trade  and  FDI,  as  the  improvement  in  accounting  information  in  turn 
fosters  financial  transparency  and  comparability  and  reduces  information 
asymmetries and unfamiliarity among agents in different countries. Nonetheless, 
the  diversity  in  the  implementation  of  the  European  accounting  harmonisation 
process, the conditional impact of IFRS on the enforcement of financial reporting 
rules and underlying financial incentives and reverse causation remain issues for 
further research. 
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TABLES 
Table 1. Variable descriptions and sources of data 
Variable  Description  Source 
a) Xijt : Exports from i to j  Value of exports, in euros from the year 2002 to 2007  Eurostat (2008) 
b) X ijt: Foreign direct 
investments from i to j 
Value of FDI, in millions of euros from the year 2002 
to 2007  Eurostat (2008) 
Equity ijt: Equity capital 
investments from i to j 
Value of equity capital, in millions of euros from the 
year 2002 to 2007  Eurostat (2008) 
RE ijt: Earnings not distributed 
by the direct investment from i 
to j 
Value of reinvested earnings, in millions of euros 
from the year 2002 to 2007  Eurostat (2008) 
Loansijt: borrowing funds from 
i to j 
Value of other FDI capital, in millions of euros from 
the year 2002 to 2007  Eurostat (2008) 
Yi  GDP (current US$) in country i  The Wold Bank, WDI online  (2010) 
Yj  GDP (current US$) in country j  The Wold Bank, WDI online  (2010) 
Pi  Population in country i  The Wold Bank, WDI online  (2010) 
Pj  Population in country j  The Wold Bank, WDI online  (2010) 
Distij : Distance 
Distance between two countries based on bilateral 
distances between the largest cities in those two 
countries,  inter-city distances being weighted by the 
share of the city in the  country’s overall population. 
CEPII (2007)  
Legal origins  Countries with English, French, German or 
Scandinavian legal traditions  La Porta et al (2007) 
Comparability effect 
IFRSijt dummy variable = 1 if in both trading partners 
listed companies use IFRS for domestic reporting as 
of the year t, 0 otherwise. Proxy for comparability 
effect 
Deloitte (several years); Amiram (2009) 
Transparency effect (1)  % of Firms expressing that a Typical Firm Reports 
less than 100% of Sales for Tax Purposes 
The Wold Bank, Business Surveys (2010). 
From http://www.enterprisesurveys.org 
Transparency effect (2)  % of Firms with Annual Financial Statement 
Reviewed by External Auditor  The Wold Bank, Business Surveys (2010) 
Exporter firms  % of Exporter Firms  The Wold Bank, Business Surveys (2010) 
Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
The UAI deals with a society's tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. It indicates to what extent 
a culture makes its members to feel either 
uncomfortable or comfortable in novel, unknown, 
surprising or different situations from the usual ones. 
From http://www.geert-hofstede.com 
 
EU dummy  Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners are 
members of the European Union, 0 otherwise   
Adjij : Adjacency dummy  Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners share a 
common border, 0 otherwise.  CEPII (2007) 
Langij : Language dummy 
Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners countries 
share a language that is spoken by at least 9% of the 
population in both countries, 0 otherwise. 
CEPII (2007) 
Comcolij : Common colonizer 
dummy 
Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners have had a  
common colonizer after 1945, 0 otherwise  CEPII (2007) 
Col45ij : Colony dummy  Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners have had a 
colonial link after 1945, 0 otherwise.  CEPII (2007) 
Smctryij : Colony dummy  Dummy variable = 1 if the trading partners were/are 
the same country, 0 otherwise  CEPII (2007) 
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Table 2. Summary statistics. Trade and FDI according to country and year. 
 
    1999     2000     2001     2002     2003     2004     2005     2006     2007     % increase (99-07) 
Country  Origins  Exports  FDI  Export  FDI  Export  FDI  Exports  FDI  Exports  FDI  Exports  FDI  Exports  FDI  Exports  FDI  Exports  FDI  Exports  FDI 
Austria  German  1,820  125.21  2,110  754.87  2,270  261.84  2,400  182.21  2,490  162.44  2,690  334.24  2,780  0.26  3,020  -57.14  3,310  723.65  81.87  477.93 
Belgium  French  5,090  2,196.50  6,020  1,708.17  6,370  4,162.50  6,630  1,385.19  6,710  240.77  7,310  609.41  7,930  930.50  8,620  915.79  9,270  1,164.54  82.12  -46.98 
Bulgaria  German  82.1  16.56  113  46.33  133  9.24  145  50.10  162  20.79  191  22.96  213  56.08  264  51.88  314  103.13  282.46  522.94 
Cyprus  English  8.78  -28.29  10  8.50  10.4  4.15  9.95  10.75  9.94  3.26  18.4  15.46  28  74.92  22.7  78.40  23.2  244.91  164.24  2781.33
a 
Czech Republic  German  838  107.00  1,040  213.73  1,240  177.39  1,340  96.29  1,450  -31.15  1,860  55.96  2,060  175.26  2,490  149.62  2,930  174.00  249.64  62.62 
Denmark  Scand.  1,290  267.73  1,510  688.18  1,540  82.50  1,630  112.26  1,590  157.69  1,670  44.00  1,850  138.97  2,010  143.89  2,040  24.74  58.14  -90.76 
Estonia  German  74.6  9.43  117  4.33  116  8.68  114  3.19  127  7.96  147  5.41  185  84.38  194  8.54  215  35.20  188.20  273.33 
Finland  Scand.  988  185.06  1,200  74.36  1,110  104.87  1,120  528.04  1,090  96.26  1,100  93.84  1,150  175.46  1,350  272.81  1,430  178.22  44.74  -3.70 
France  French  7,640  962.56  8,810  1,338.0  8,890  724.77  8,740  1,632.42  8,850  804.67  9,170  778.25  9,050  434.87  9,930  951.00  10,000  910.24  30.89  -5.44 
Germany  German  12,800  2,741.42  14,900  10,954.9  15,600  1,507.83  15,900  1,708.92  16,600  1,329.35  18,200  105.17  19,300  1,266.72  21,500  1,368.90  24,100  967.42  88.28  -64.71 
Greece  French  265  45.07  303  28.53  310  138.65  234  38.77  295  75.08  304  27.92  328  45.39  406  164.50  424  105.23  60.00  133.49 
Hungary  German  763  41.29  982  94.00  1,090  110.56  1,190  18.29  1,230  179.64  1,430  181.92  1,570  575.47  1,830  167.21  2,090  518.96  173.92  1157.0 
Ireland  English  1,700  902.47  1,990  1,327.93  2,210  448.11  2,340  1,613.22  1,970  803.16  2,030  780.58  2,160  344.80  2,110  987.21  2,160  1,087.41  27.06  20.49 
Italy  French  5,440  503.78  6,160  570.06  6,410  632.00  6,300  492.61  6,340  413.18  6,760  458.89  7,060  839.06  7,810  1,038.63  8,280  1,452.85  52.21  188.39 
Latvia  German  48.3  9.08  62.8  2.50  67.5  8.06  72.3  0.85  78.1  -7.14  92.3  19.68  122  5.73  137  16.61  169  46.27  249.90  409.78 
Lithuania  French  73.3  17.31  111  2.83  135  18.53  148  13.89  149  13.62  193  8.30  240  7.67  276  97.72  312  21.63  325.65  24.94 
Luxembourg  French  260  3,075.00  303  3,733.29  369  4,430.46  362  1,041.22  398  741.77  447  922.21  504  -412.67  623  189.36  551  2,664.24  111.92  -13.36 
Malta  French  35  20.60  34.7  1.33  41.1  5.15  39.1  1.38  37.4  30.50  38  45.27  37.4  111.00  40.6  494.52  41.6  -83.61  18.86  2300.59
b 
Netherlands  French  6,470  2,619.47  7,890  909.18  8,070  463.52  7,980  4,689.00  8,090  1,684.86  8,820  3,497.07  10,000  1,244.45  11,200  3,133.45  12,000  8,407.84  85.47  220.97 
Poland  German  806  562.57  1,070  553.33  1,260  289.68  1,360  70.14  1,500  75.85  1,860  353.00  2,170  102.77  2,680  218.39  3,060  356.86  279.65  -36.57 
Portugal  French  746  181.14  827  504.71  841  133.95  857  123.05  875  311.45  886  252.82  905  252.27  993  248.23  1,070  133.75  43.43  -26.16 
Romania  French  224  51.73  313  57.50  368  54.88  417  27.05  452  26.89  544  111.81  600  78.74  699  281.73  813  208.26  262.95  302.61 
Slovakia  German  330  45.00  442  115.54  490  96.72  524  194.18  638  -21.74  744  59.63  859  55.96  1,110  76.07  1,410  60.00  327.27  33.33 
Slovenia  German  228  37.29  263  23.20  281  30.53  289  59.89  296  31.33  341  11.96  406  24.75  487  14.79  584  19.00  156.14  -49.04 
Spain  French  2,750  544.06  3,460  812.50  3,680  565.21  3,790  465.91  3,960  377.80  4,150  539.64  4,240  750.79  4,580  483.43  4,680  2,113.33  70.18  288.44 
Sweden  Scand.  1,850  935.94  2,120  1,521.28  1,850  -123.82  1,890  595.36  1,990  241.66  2,190  194.67  2,290  123.41  2,710  475.46  2,890  125.00  56.22  -86.64 
United Kingdom  English  5,860  6,424.88  6,960  5,895.61  6,910  2,484.18  6,950  2,248.08  6,120  2,512.66  6,290  2,969.76  6,800  4,880.26  8,570  2,947.83  7,070  2,724.54  20.65  -57.59 
Sources: Deloitte (2003-2008), Eurostat, La Porta et al (2007) and own elaboration. Note: Mean exports to the rest of EU-27 members are presented in millions of euro. Mean FDI 
inflows from the rest of EU-27 members, the United States, China, Japan, EFTA members and candidate countries are also shown in millions of euro. A negative sign for flows 
indicates disinvestment. a) 2000-2007; b) 1999-2006.   20 
Table 3. Determinants of trade in goods in Europe. 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Exporter’s income  0.8***  0.94***  0.9***  1.01***  0.9***  1.02*** 
  24.7  15.02  14.24  19.49  14.08  19.88 
Importer’s income  0.6***  0.71***  0.71***  0.83***  0.72***  0.72*** 
  18.42  13.2  13.24  13.13  13.49  11.36 
Exporter’s population  0.22***  0.07  0.1  0.05  0.13  0.04 
  5.53  0.94  1.26  0.75  1.61  0.64 
Importer’s population  0.26***  0.18***  0.18***  -0.01  0.17***  0.1 
  6.27  2.76  2.88  -0.07  2.72  1.19 
Comparability effect  -0.05  0.06         
  -0.89  0.31         
Distance  -1.5***  -1.6***  -1.58***  -1.8***  -1.62***  -1.81*** 
  -28.58  -22.53  -22.43  -25.4  -23.07  -25.89 
FIX  0.07**  0.09  0.09  0.17***  0.09  0.03 
  2.59  1.22  1.26  2.69  1.31  0.46 
Number of exporting firms    0.53***  0.61***    0.48***   
    4.43  5.01    3.98   
Transparency effect in 
exporter (1)      -0.11***       
      -3.27       
Transparency effect in 
importer (1)        0.12***     
        3.84     
Transparency effect in 
exporter (2)          0.28**   
          2.46   
Transparency effect in 
importer (2)            0.54*** 
            4.84 
Constant term  -13.5***  -17.36***  -16.82***  -14.84***  -18.07***  -15.24*** 
  -16.89  -11.76  -11.44  -10.37  -12.16  -10.69 
Time dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of observations  4210  754  754  753  754  753 
R2_within  0.41  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.49  0.49 
R2_overall  0.88  0.85  0.85  0.88  0.85  0.88 
RMSE  0.34  0.39  0.39  0.35  0.4  0.35 
 Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are provided below 
every coefficient. The dependent variable in trade regressions is the natural logarithm of exports in value 
(euros).    21
Table 4. Determinants of FDI in Europe. 
 
Variable  (7)FDI  (8)EQ  (9)RE  (10)Loans  (11)FDI  (12)EQ  (13)RE  (14)Loans  (15)FDI  (16)EQ  (17)RE  (18)Loans 
Exporter’s income  0.35***  0.31***  0.42***  0.28***  0.29  0.14  0.43***  0.17  0.37***  0.34***  0.42***  0.31*** 
  5.01  5.17  6.3  4.45  1.47  1.13  3.19  1.07  5.27  5.62  6.38  5.01 
Importer’s income  0.07  0.06  0.12**  0.1**  -0.01  -0.01  0.12  0.06  0.07  0.06  0.11**  0.1** 
  1.21  1.18  2.2  2.08  -0.09  -0.14  1.21  0.51  1.22  1.19  2.21  2.15 
Exporter’s population  -0.08***  -0.12***  -0.15***  -0.05*  -0.07  -0.07  -0.21***  0.06  -0.1***  -0.14***  -0.15***  -0.07*** 
  -2.68  -4.42  -5.1  -1.75  -0.68  -0.97  -2.86  0.65  -3.12  -5.17  -5.21  -2.61 
Importer’s population  0.09***  0.06**  0.02  0.05*  0.09  0.05  0.04  0.08  0.09***  0.06**  0.02  0.05* 
  3  2.11  0.63  1.83  0.98  0.95  0.74  1.15  3.05  2.18  0.64  1.94 
Comparability effect  0.09**  0.19***  0.2***  0.21***          0.11***  0.23***  0.21***  0.24*** 
  2.39  6.43  6.18  5.41          3.02  7.47  6.24  6.32 
Distance  -0.21*  -0.09  -0.15  -0.16  -0.16  -0.04  -0.32  -0.31  -0.22*  -0.09  -0.15  -0.17 
  -1.72  -0.84  -1.31  -1.47  -0.48  -0.19  -1.42  -1.16  -1.76  -0.87  -1.32  -1.57 
Lagged exports  -0.15*  -0.09  -0.16**  -0.18**  -0.09  0  -0.21  -0.19  -0.15*  -0.09  -0.16**  -0.19*** 
  -1.85  -1.21  -2.03  -2.55  -0.41  0.03  -1.43  -1.11  -1.88  -1.24  -2.04  -2.66 
Transparency effect in importer (1)          -0.14***  -0.13***  -0.15***  -0.1**         
          -3.11  -4.26  -4.57  -2.55         
Comparability *Low-uncertainty                  -0.23***  -0.31***  -0.05  -0.34*** 
                  -3.13  -5.23  -0.82  -5.14 
Constant term  -0.24  -0.51  -1.98*  0.82  1.84  3.15  0.75  3.93  -0.45  -0.78  -2.02*  0.43 
  -0.19  -0.46  -1.64  0.73  0.54  1.48  0.33  1.46  -0.36  -0.72  -1.68  0.38 
Number of observations  5181  4891  4709  4646  678  627  619  612  5181  4891  4709  4646 
R2_within  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.05  0.05  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01 
R2_overall  0.05  0.08  0.09  0.03  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.02  0.05  0.08  0.09  0.03 
RMSE  1.12  0.87  0.89  1.12  1.15  0.85  0.92  1.07  1.12  0.88  0.89  1.12 
Notes: ***, **, *, indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Z-statistics are provided below every coefficient. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
FDI, equity (EQ), retained earnings (RE) or loans.   22 
Table 5. Uncertainty aversion groups in the EU. Cluster analysis. 
 
Low uncertainty aversion  Middle uncertainty aversion  High uncertainty aversion 
DENMARK  AUSTRIA  BELGIUM 
IRELAND  CZECH REPUBLIC  BULGARIA 
SWEDEN  ESTONIA  FRANCE 
UNITED KINGDOM  FINLAND  GREECE 
  GERMANY  HUNGARY 
  ITALY  MALTA 
  LUXEMBOURG  POLAND 
  NETHERLANDS  PORTUGAL 
  SLOVAKIA  ROMANIA 
    SPAIN 
       23
APPENDIX 
 
Table A.1. Business Survey, data availability. 
 
Country  Time coverage  Year  Observations 
% of Firms expressing that 
a Typical Firm Reports less 
than 100% of Sales for Tax 
Purposes 
% of Firms with Annual 
Financial Statement 
Reviewed by External 
Auditor 
% of Exporter 
Firms 
Bulgaria  2002, 2004, 2005, 2007  2007  1015  16.38  30.95  12.2 
China  2003  2003  3948  49.45  70.79  24.48 
Croatia  2002, 2005, 2007  2005  176  32.3  50.57  38.51 
Czech Republic  2002, 2005  2005  208  52.2  43.84  32.69 
Estonia  2002, 2005  2005  172  26.47  85.21  32.56 
Germany  2005  2005  1196  ..  54.15  16.39 
Greece  2005  2005  546  53.19  48.32  19.23 
Hungary  2002, 2005  2005  460  40.72  81.07  42.83 
Ireland  2005  2005  501  28.78  94.59  33.27 
Latvia  2002, 2005  2005  141  25.37  64.75  33.33 
Lithuania  2002, 2004, 2005  2005  150  41.94  46.62  41.33 
Poland  2002, 2003, 2005  2005  609  43.97  43.55  33.33 
Portugal  2005  2005  505  37.25  80  19.01 
Romania  2002, 2005  2005  498  26.46  36.63  25.5 
Slovak Republic  2002, 2005  2005  143  22.48  63.38  40.14 
Slovenia  2002, 2005  2005  159  39.19  40.76  54.43 
Spain  2005  2005  606  18.33  58.31  21.78 
Turkey  2002, 2004, 2005  2005  1323  82.14  33.06  51.06 
Total firms      12356         24 
 